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Executive Summary
Maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia subsided in 2012 as dramatically as it exploded in 2007.
But it is too early to celebrate as the domestic and foreign root causes, chief operators, and foot
soldiers of piracy remain intact. These factors bode ill to long-term security of the nearby sealanes and hinterlands.
In the absence of a government to deter it, Illegal, Unregulated, Unreported (IUU) fishing posed
an existential threat to Somali artisanal fishing. That threat along with widespread claims of
hazardous waste dumping became the root causes of piracy. As a result, Somali fishermen
initially took to piracy as a legitimate means of defending their interests.
Unscrupulous criminals took advantage of these impromptu community responses, introduced a
lucrative business model, and aggressively recruited expert divers and able-bodied fishermen
into a new trade of predatory ransom piracy.
In the immediate aftermath of the explosion of piracy, rampant joblessness supplied the piracy
industry with a seemingly endless reservoir of manpower, contributing to make Somalia, and
particularly Puntland, uninviting to job-creating investments. The international community has
ignored the corporate crimes and the developmental factors behind the emergence and rise of
piracy.
In spite of staggering sums of ransom money that pirates collected and contrary to widespread
claims that Somalis benefited as a result, the vast majority of Somalis, in general, and
Puntlanders, in particular, suffered under heavy weight of piracy.
Even though the consequences of piracy, as a criminal enterprise, were not immediately felt, it
became the proverbial last straw that worsened the communities’ conditions. The export-oriented
Somali artisanal fishing hit rock bottom as a result. The thriving of piracy contributed to the
dramatic deterioration of security and safety among previously peaceful coastal communities and
erosion of their values. In addition to the women, children and internally displaced persons who
have particularly fallen victim to pirates’ excesses, there is no accurate figure of how many
young Somali men perished during counter-piracy actions of the international navies and private
security personnel (onboard or escorting passerby vessels) or were lost in the high seas. With
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more than 1,000 men incarcerated in prisons around the world, these numbers can only be
conjectured by the countless families that have lost loved ones, widowed wives and orphaned
children. It is a tragedy of epic proportions.
Besides the intra-clan tensions and bloody inter-clan conflicts that they triggered, pirates brought
about foreign government and commercial counter-piracy initiatives that have produced, locally
and globally, the most consequential effects of piracy off the coast of Somalia. In many
instances, international navies and private security personnel do not follow clear and uniform
code of conduct nor are they accountable for their numerous errors, deliberate or accidental.
Locally, several coastal communities have rejected ransom piracy. Led by religious scholars,
titled traditional elders and elected office holders (in partnership with international
organizations), grassroots communities, local NGOs, women’s groups and youth groups have
launched aggressive awareness raising campaigns. These campaigns proved very effective in
convincing many pirates to quit their criminal activities and many coastal communities to stop
dealing with the remaining pirates.
Based on research into the ground-level experiences and perspectives, this report broadly
examines the root causes and dynamics of piracy off the Puntland region of Somalia before
discussing the effects of ransom piracy in that region and the local counter-piracy responses.
Accordingly, the following policy recommendations are put forward:
Any sound internal and external approach to the scourge of piracy off the coast of Somalia
requires an honest recognition that IUU fishing is one of the few principal factors
precipitating piracy; and an appreciation that Somalis carried the heaviest brunt of both
crimes of IUU fishing and ransom piracy.
The international community should not force ‘solutions’ on Somalis without providing
assistance to implement those solutions – or at least making concerted efforts to that effect.
If at all adopted, such ‘solutions’ would only last so long as their sponsors are prepared to
bankroll them.
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Coastal countries in the region need to put in place and enforce responsible regimes of port
state control in order to raise the bar on security and safety requirements for seaworthy
vessels.
The international community should assist countries along the African east coast and the
neighboring Middle Eastern and Asian countries to construct and maintain waste
management facilities so that vessels (passing through or operating in those waters) can
responsibly dispose of ship-generated waste.
International stakeholders, neighboring countries, and, most importantly, governments
across the Somali region need to cooperate in charting out a cohesive and sustainable landbased security solutions while simultaneously addressing the developmental factors
contributing to the persistence of piracy or threats thereof.
In that spirit and without necessarily compromising their respective positions on the
polarizing political issues, all governing authorities across the Somali region need to
harmonize Somali maritime law with the 1982 UNCLOS, synchronize their policies and
actions with regard to the vast Somali maritime space, and coordinate their maritime and
overland security operations and justice systems with regard to piracy, which is a common
threat.
More specifically to Puntland, the region needs to establish an inter-ministerial body to
organize its policies and actions on issues of maritime security and safety.
Because many pirate linchpins and the vast potential of recruits remain intact (and possibly
metastasizing into different forms of organized criminal networks), the international
community should provide sustained assistance to Puntland’s security sector.
Local and foreign NGO-driven job-creating efforts are needed to create opportunities by
investing in sustainable, large-scale strategic projects such as rebuilding and expanding the
overland and maritime infrastructure.
Efforts should be made to address the gaping policy vacuum to rehabilitate the marine
environment, which may include a suspension of all fishing licenses; a moratorium on the
issuance of new ones until authorities across the Somali region devise harmonized and
enforceable policies; incentivizing the governments to do so by aiding their economies to
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make up for the loss from the fishing licenses; eviction of foreign industrial and artisanal
fishing crafts and enabling the Somali fishing sector to recover and thrive again.
Continue raising awareness on a more aggressive and sustainable scale to empower the
grassroots, and to devise programs to protect women, children and IDP communities, and
rehabilitate victims.
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Introduction

Piracy off the coast of Somalia has subsided and may even be coming to an end. 1 Nevertheless,
its root causes are still intact as are its higher-most networks and reservoir of potential recruits at
the grassroots. Moreover, its consequences on Somalia and Somalis will remain consequential to
the region and the international community. Averting a relapse to the pre-2012 rate of attacks
and ridding the region of the scourge of piracy calls for a proper understanding of its effects on
the Somali people and an appreciation and support of their uncelebrated successes in combating
it.
There has been rising – albeit still wanting – attention to the global impact of piracy off the coast
of Somalia. Journalistic and editorial accounts sounded alarm bells about the broader
consequences of piracy. Large-scale reports have made some useful statistical estimates of global
economic consequences and human costs of Somali piracy. International stakeholders have been
holding numerous symposia and ongoing – if intermittent – multilateral consultations to combat
piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean region. Likewise, there has been much
fanfare – some well-deserved – about the accomplishments of the international antipiracy naval
armada off the coast of Somalia. The impact of piracy on coastal Somali communities and what
these communities have so far done about it is starkly missing in the discourse, as are the effects
of the international counter-piracy efforts.
This report helps fill that void by presenting findings of extensive fieldwork and supplementary
desktop research into the causes and dynamics of piracy as well as consequences of piracy and
counter-piracy operations in the semiautonomous Puntland State of Somalia. It draws
particularly heavily from Somali voices through open-ended individual interviews with dozens
of reliable oral informants; participatory action research involving groups of elders, youth,
women, and professionals all selected for their knowledge and experiences; and different sets of
surveys randomly conducted among Somali men and women in Puntland’s three major towns of
Garowe, Galkacyo and Bosaso. The focus on Puntland

2

is due to the fact that the

semiautonomous region has the longest coastline that had also produced or housed some of the
most notorious pirates and pirate hubs. Moreover, access to and feasibility of fieldwork in the
region made the research possible.
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After broadly examining the root causes and dynamics of piracy, the report particularly addresses
the following questions:
How has piracy affected Somali coastal communities that are active in fishing and in
small- to medium-scale maritime trade?
How have the international counter-piracy operations been impacting these Somali
communities?
What are the local views and perception of what may contribute to its lasting, and
forward-looking resolution?
What has been and is being done by Somalis to overcome piracy and its concomitant
challenges?
In addressing these questions, this report offers a window into the plight of Somalis under the
heavy weight of piracy in order to find a lasting land-based solutions to the ongoing crime;
solutions that are homegrown, locally-driven, and internationally-supported.
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The Historical Background

Somali piracy is a relatively recent phenomenon3 that, as reported by some, initially started in
reaction to the latent and manifest violence that illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU)
fishing wreaked on the coastal communities during the years of civil war. Commercially
oriented, small-scale, artisanal Somali fishing was among the main casualties of the large-scale
illegal industrial fishing. Foreign trawlers, coming as close as two miles in some areas and five in
others, and increasingly armed, attacked Somali fishermen, destroyed their gear, diminished their
catch, and ruined their livelihoods.4
The losses of the local fishing communities were not only material as local reports indicate that
some artisanal fishermen have been run over by the big fishing vessels or their crafts destroyed
in the waves of the passing trawlers. Between late 2007 and early 2008, villagers in the coastal
village of Gabac witnessed from the mountaintop overlooking the sea a big fishing vessel sailing
directly into a small artisanal boat that had been fishing there. The three fishermen aboard the
latter were seen jumping into the water just before the small boat submerged upon contact with
the trawler.5 This cascade of troubles was compounded by natural disasters that pushed the shortlived lucrative fishing sector on a fast downward spiral. In late December 2004, the tsunami that
hit the Indian Ocean coasts devastated the local fishing companies in many ways,6 one of which
was a drastic decline of their already reduced catch. 7 The tsunami also washed toxic waste
canisters up the Somali coast and thrust the question of waste dumping in Somalia back into
public debate.
The stories of IUU fishing (and hazardous waste dumping), and the international community’s
silence about them continue to evoke strong feelings among Somalis. They offered legitimate
grounds for taking action against these reported violations – and have also served as moral
justification for pirates claiming to be doing so.8 Particularly, in the absence of a government to
appeal to, the initial defensive response by Somali fishermen became a precursor to the
widespread phenomena of ransom piracy when the earliest captured illegal fishers proved too
eager to pay ‘fines’. The collection of such ‘fines’ took a life of its own and what was considered
as defensive piracy, quickly evolved to the epic levels of criminal ransom piracy.
Meanwhile, concerned about international implications of piracy and under rising internal
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pressures to defend Puntland’s maritime cash crop from foreign international pirates, the nascent
government of the newly inaugurated semiautonomous region of Puntland contracted a private
maritime security company to manage and protect the territory’s marine resources. Garowe
entrusted the company with the task of issuing fishing licenses and founding a functional
coastguard with the anticipated proceeds. Nevertheless, whereas one company “took the
licensing idea but did not take the patrolling” seriously,9 the other company “was keeping the
security of their own licensed ships instead of keeping the security of the sea.”10 As a result,
foreign trawlers continued fishing deep in inshore waters with the indirect authorization and
protection of the state. Whatever the merits of these privatized security solutions, the local
fishing communities did not see them any differently than they did other foreign trawlers that
stole their fish at gunpoint – literally.11
Thus left to their own devices, the local communities and their fishermen continued to take
matters into their own hands and chase foreign fishing vessels until ransom piracy hijacked what
many believe was a legitimate act of self-defense. The tipping point from these defensive attacks
to lucrative and criminal ransom piracy took place between 2003 and 2004 when a few men
introduced an attractive business model of harnessing the enormous potential they saw in
hijacking ships for ransom. 12 Their trade quickly took a life of its own and deprived what
remained of the Somali fishing sector of the needed manpower while scaring away significant
portion of the legitimate small- to medium-scale maritime commercial activities, bringing instead
international condemnation and military response.
Nevertheless, while many Somalis rejected ransom piracy and still do so, others approved of it
because they believe it was a legitimate response. In a 2012 random survey conducted among
236 youth in Puntland’s three main towns (Bosaso, Garowe and Galkacyo), over 34 percent said
that illegal fishing (46 respondents) and waste dumping (36 respondents) caused piracy and an
equal percentage of the respondents approved of piracy. Those who ‘approve’ of piracy (33
respondents) and those who ‘somewhat approve’ (45 respondents) correspond roughly with those
who think piracy was ‘positive’ (26 respondents) and ‘somewhat positive’ (45 respondents).
Furthermore, both of the latter responses correspond with those who attributed piracy to illegal
fishing and waste dumping.
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The Advent and Dynamics of Ransom Piracy in Puntland

The toxic mix of lawlessness, unemployment, poverty and the resource pirates’ alacrity to pay
rising fines sent awry the legitimate self-defense of Somali fishermen and offered a fertile
ground for ransom piracy to the long-term detriment of Somali political, economic, and security
interests as well as its social and moral fabric.
The evolution of defensive piracy to predatory business was helped by many factors that are at
the heart of the inability of experienced seamen to sustain themselves and support their families.
These include: 1) over-fishing due to lack of alternative or supplementary livelihoods decreased
their catch in inshore waters; 2) IUU plundering of the marine environment at a faster rate than it
could recuperate and replenish its resources, which combined with shrinking Indian Ocean fish
stocks, further reduced the artisanal fishermen’s catch even in the offshore waters; 3) the 2004
tsunami dealt the withering fishing sector an irreversible blow, shedding off its remaining
employees. All these combined to push many more subsistence and employed fishermen out of
legitimate lines of work into the warm embrace of ransom piracy – townspeople and nomads
from the interior joined in later on.
In the absence of strong law enforcement, the fresh and growing reservoir of experienced seamen
without jobs and living in abject poverty offered an ideal ground for the few business-minded
organizers to recruit and train men for hijacking ships in the high seas, ushering in the epic
phenomena of modern-day piracy. The pioneers of ransom piracy appeared patriotic and
appealed to the legitimate grievances of the local communities against the illegal fishers. They
called themselves marines or coastguards and received some support – actively or passively –
from the local communities. However, what little enthusiasm the population held toward the
pirates started to fade, especially after 2007 when non-fishing commercial vessels appeared
along their coasts in increasing numbers and their sailors were held for ransom.
The local consequences of ransom piracy were not fully felt across Puntland until after 2007.
Since then, it has had direct and devastating effects on every aspect of Somali livelihood in that
region. The reasons are multiple and inter-related.
Earlier that year, the existing inter-clan business organization of pirates had broken down. The

DMPP: When Elephants Fight, the Grass Suffers: A report on the Local Consequences of Piracy in Puntland

7

three principal leaders discontinued their relations and clan- and sub-clan based loose pirate
groupings emerged. The increased homogeneity of pirate groups attracted previously reluctant
investors who now rushed to offer capital to groups from their own clans or sub-clans. A onetime pirate and subsequent investor and notorious Galkacyo gangster related how upon his return
to Garowe from a successful pirate operation in late 2008, “there was this rush by investors who
offered money for future missions.”13 There also emerged a group of potential recruits with skills
that investors (old and new alike) and pirate kingpins coveted.
During the final eighteen months of Mohamud Hirsi Muse’s (Cadde Muse) presidency, Puntland
experienced its worst financial crisis that it was unable to afford the salaries of its employees.
After several months of going without pay, many soldiers abandoned the defense force and
started searching for alternative means of supporting themselves and their families. Many of
these well-trained and disciplined men were recruited into pirate groups.
Previously, pirates typically went into ‘hibernation’ after every successful hijacking. They spent
their loot in relative obscurity and only came out to prepare for another operation after
exhausting their loot. Since 2008, however, investors started to pour money (on credit) – in cash
and in kind – to lure the non-pirate youth into piracy and retain the committed pirates. A pirate
recruiter, for example, gave a potential recruit a day’s worth of khat (the leafy, mildly narcotic
drug) to chew, a place to sleep, and $1,000 to send to his family before asking him if he were
ready to join a group of pirates about to go to the sea. The answer of the former-soldier-turnedpirate-recruit was swift and unmistakable: “I am prepared to die now!”14
The consequences proved devastating to the local communities and eroded what little support
pirates had enjoyed among their hosts. With the increasing number of soldiers-turned-pirates and
disintegration of inter-clan pirate groups, the existing ‘code’ among pirates dissolved. Pirates
started to double cross each other across and within clan groupings. The consequent tension and
violence within and among pirate groups led to increased insecurity of local communities
wherever the pirates landed.
Moreover, investors and pirate groups rushed to outdo their rivals by attracting the better skilled
and bigger number of recruits. In the process, pirate recruiters and organizers started
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unprecedented extravagance that drew growing number of able-bodied men to piracy and
generally worsened the security of the willing or increasingly unwilling host communities and
deteriorated their social fabric.
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The Effects of Ransom Piracy

Piracy has caused significant harm to the Somalis – in coastal areas and inland towns alike. It
destroyed the livelihoods of those who depended on the fishing sector; it directly and indirectly
caused the prices of consumer goods to skyrocket; and it scared away legitimate businesses and
job-creating investments. Pirates contributed to the deterioration of social values, exposed their
communities to unprecedented kinds of physical insecurity and violation of social norms; and
became a drain to the meager services that are available.
4.1.

Collapse of the Fishing Sector

Ransom piracy eroded the sustainability of subsistence fishing and became the proverbial last
straw that broke the back of the Somali-owned, export-oriented, rudimentary but lucrative
fishing sector. Ransom piracy worsened the IUU initiated vicious cycle of diminishing catch,
declining income, dwindling capital to invest in equipment, hence reduced catch and
employment opportunities.
This downward spiral of the Somali fishing sector, compounded by the tough competition from
the industrial IUU fishers and natural disasters, pushed many to illegally migrate to greener
pastures elsewhere in the Horn of Africa or the Middle East. Others were either cajoled into
piracy or joined in of their own volition. Piracy and fishing have since developed an inversely
proportional relationship, the reversal of which bodes well for a sustainable Somali solution to
the scourge of piracy.
Even though many companies went bankrupt and closed down, a few surviving companies
started to bring laborers from south and central Somalia to make up for their loss of manpower to
piracy. Within days of coming to the fishing villages, the fishermen would make contact with
pirates, who actively recruit them or provide handouts of cash, food, drinks or chew – as they do
to shahat.15 Even as shahat, the newly arrived laborers end up making more money (in cash and
in kind) than they normally would as laborers or divers for the fishing companies that brought
them there in the first place. Most of them quit within days and the companies were left
scrambling for new manpower.
Helped by multiple interlocking factors, the evolution of defensive piracy to the predatory
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business of ransom piracy thus contributed to the collapse of the fishing sector. Based on
statistics from three companies with complete data sets, the following table best demonstrates the
dire predicament of the fishing sector in the hands of foreign resource pirates and Somali ransom
pirates.
Figure 1: Lobster exports by private Somali fishing companies

Moreover, pirates affected the individual fishermen directly and indirectly. Indirectly, pirates
compromised the safety of the small-scale local fishermen because international navies could not
tell the two apart and innocent fishermen became victims of anti-piracy forces. After many such
incidents, fishermen feared to venture out to sea and many completely stopped doing so. This
aspect of the consequences of piracy is discussed in more detail in later sections.
More directly, Somali fishermen have consistently complained about pirates stealing their fishing
boats and catch, fighting and injuring or killing them in the process. Whereas executives of a
fishing company in Bosaso related the injuries and deaths their smaller-scale fishermen suffered
in the hands of the pirates, a fisherwoman from Eyl lost one of her boats to pirates, but
intercepted another daring group of pirates pulling her other boat behind their truck and driving
fast through Bedey, the coastal half of Eyl.16 Many other fishermen were not as fortunate as
pirates succeeded to steal their equipment and their catch. A fisherman told SomaliaReport that
“pirates came to Bargal beach [in late 2011] and seized my friend’s boat. They took it to Oman
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and my friend never saw his boat again.” 17 Another fisherman in Lasqorey also told
SomaliaReport how pirates stole their catch at gunpoint: “One day…Somali pirates with a small
boat like ours came over and asked us to buy a fish. They didn’t have much money so we refused
them. Finally they forced us to give them the fish that we worked so hard to catch.”18
4.2.

Inflation and Price Hikes

Prices of basic consumer goods started to rise sharply in the immediate aftermath of the
explosion of ransom piracy in 2007. In October 2012, the Puntland Ministry of Planning and
International Cooperation (MOPIC) released a price index of basic consumer goods for the major
cities in the preceding four years (with 2005 as a base year for Garowe and Bosaso and 2008 for
Galkacyo). Accordingly, the retail prices of basic necessities like foodstuffs, medicines and
clothing rose by an average of 47.62 percent per year in Garowe and Bosaso. Even Galkacyo’s
already high price index witnessed an additional average increase of 15.30 percent per year
during the same time frame. 19 Compiled from 2012 MOPIC data, Figure 2 illustrates the
percentage increase in price for basic consumer goods in Puntland, which happened in at least
two easily identifiable ways: spendthrift pirates’ massive borrowing on exorbitant interest rates
and skyrocketing insurance premiums that also impeded trade.20
Figure 2: Percentage increase in price index for basic consumer goods in Puntland

Percentage increase in price index for basic
consumer goods in Puntland
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Trickling Down of Insurance Costs and Impediments to Trade

Speaking about the whole of Somalia, a Somali businessman and contractor related how, on top
of its being completely unsupported by a state or the international community, the economy
suffered due to piracy. Among other things, foreign vessels refused to transport goods to
Somalia.21 Former Somali Prime Minister, Abdiweli Mohamed Ali Gaas, similarly speaks of the
toll the exorbitant insurance premiums had exacted on Somalia. According to him, of the more
than 20,000 vessels that sail past the Gulf of Aden, less than 5 percent came under attack by
Somali pirates, and at the height of pirate success, 3 percent of the attacked were actually
hijacked and their crew taken hostage. But insurance costs increased for all those buying
coverage when sailing past the piracy prone waters – in some cases insurance premiums tripled
or quadrupled.22
More specifically to Puntland, the Bosaso-based Chamber of Commerce shows that piracy
hampered Puntland’s imports and exports with a direct bearing on prices of basic consumer
goods in local markets and export of livestock. Early on, the majority of south Asian-owned
dhows that transported goods to and from Bosaso ceased operations as pirate attacks escalated.
The ones that continued to operate did so at a significantly increased transportation charge (as
much as 30 percent across the board) for the same cargo because of the increased insurance
premiums for sailing in piracy-infested waters.23
Moreover, foreign traders lost confidence to send their goods for their Somali partners to sell and
send back the money – as they had been doing before piracy. As a result the relationship of
Somali business people with foreign partners stopped and many such companies went out of
business. 24 That reduced competition among suppliers and gave them significant pricing
leverage.
All those costs ultimately trickled down to retail prices and the end consumers absorbed them
without new or additional sources of income. Although the market of consumer goods started to
feel the squeeze from piracy, however, prices did not fully respond until 2009 with an immediate
jump that has since plateaued (with the exception of Galkacyo that declined although retail prices
of consumer good there remained comparable to the other towns). A random visit to any retail
store in one of Puntland’s towns demonstrates how the consumers absorb these increased costs.
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The table below is a pricing of the most-sold medicines over a six-year period taken from a
pharmacy in Garowe that has a full record of its prices over the years.25
Figure 3: Prices (in Somali Shilling) for most-sold medicines over a period of six-years at a pharmacy in Garowe
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Figure 4: Prices (in Somali Shilling) for most-sold medicines over a period of six-years at a pharmacy in Garowe
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The Livestock Business Suffered

The export of livestock supports the livelihoods of many Somalis and is an important source of
revenue for the Puntland state of Somalia. 26 As per statistics from Puntland’s Ministry of
Livestock and Animal Husbandry, the region’s export of livestock steadily rose since its
establishment in 1998 and averaged at 1.8 million heads of livestock between 2005 and 2008,
with 2008 witnessing the summit figure of 1,926,062 heads.27 But that dropped to an average of
1.4 million heads of livestock between 2009 and 2011, and the year 2012 was expected to end
with a further drop in livestock export at about 1.3 million heads. 28 The secretariat of the
Chamber of Commerce has a nuanced explanation for the dramatic decrease in Puntland
livestock export during the height of piracy.
Because foreign buyers do not have guarantees that their purchases would arrive safely, they
started to demand that Freight is on Board (FOB) before they pay for it. The risk borne by
Puntland traders is increased even more by the fact that Puntland does not have the Letter of
Credit (LC) system.29 Foreign companies also started to demand that Puntland traders bring their
livestock to Djibouti,30 reducing the revenue that the state would have collected from exports
through the port of Bosaso. Meanwhile, the livestock-supplying nomads were not immune to the
inflation that affected Puntlanders from all walks of life, without necessarily earning more for
their cattle, sheep/goats and camels.
Figure 5: Puntland’s livestock export
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Spendthrift Pirates’ Massive Borrowing

Average pirates hardly retained fluid cash before – or long after – the delivery of ransoms.
Wherever they went pirates and their entourage of shahat either bought supplies on credit from
local businesses or borrowed massively. Given the pirates’ desperation at the moment and their
alacrity to pay hefty interest afterwards, and given the overall level of risk involved for the
legitimate retail businesses, the latter demanded – and in many cases were offered without
demanding – as much as 100 percent interest rates, which dramatically spiked the prices of
commodities for everyone.
Generally negotiations to free captured ships during the first two years (between 2007 and 2009)
did not drag on for long and ransoms were quickly delivered.31 During those years, pirates also
paid back their debts as quickly as the ransoms were received. The speed with which those debts
were settled had the immediate effect of doubling the prices of commodities in pirate dens.
This increase in prices was not restricted to coastal villages, as those in the town also showed
commensurate rise. Businesses in inland towns gave out credits to their partners in the coast and
faced as much risks as they charged interests that were as quickly paid as the ransoms were
delivered and pirate debts in the coast settled. Meanwhile, immediately after the capture of the
ship(s), the attack team(s) (no more than 20 pirates per ship) descended on the nearby towns and
got on their own spending spree on credit secured by the captured ship along the coast.
Immediately after the ransom was paid and split, the ground/security teams also went to the
towns to spend their smaller share of the ill-gotten fortunes. Even when they were paying for
their purchases up front, pirates were too willing to continue paying twice the value of the items.
The risk in such lending was not a hypothetical one.
After amassing so much debt for food (for the hostages and hostage takers alike), and for the
pirates’ khat, alcohol and other luxuries like cars and women, the hostage takers themselves
become hostages of their creditors, perpetuating at least at the individual level the cycle of piracy
and its consequences. Typically, the captured ship(s) secured the debt that its captors incurred.
But in case the pirates lose the ship(s) either because the crew overpower their captors or are
rescued or other unforeseen reason, they are not expected to pay the debt they incurred until the
day they lost the ship(s) – but few if any associate with them afterwards much less give them
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credit. Often times, the post-hijacking lenders of the pirates (the local businesses and individual
investors) are different from the initial investors who dispatched the pirate team in the first place;
and both end up absorbing their respective losses.32
A classic example is the case of the Libyan-owned, North Korean-flagged MV Rim. Pirates
captured MV Rim in February 2010 close to Yemen and marshaled it to the waters near Garacad.
In a mysterious chain of event in June, the 10-man Syrian crew overpowered their captors, took
control of the ship, and sailed it out of Garacad. In the interim months, one of the two pirate
leaders incurred as much as $300,000 in debt that he remembers, but is neither in a position to
repay nor expected to.
A similar recent case is that of MV Iceberg I. After more than two and half years of holding it
captive and accruing debt, the pirates lost to the nascent Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF)
that took control of the ship and freed its surviving 22 sailors in December 2012. Highly reliable
sources indicate that the pirates’ debt reached $2.5 million.
The cumulative effect of these dynamics was the parallel rise in commodity prices across the
board in Puntland, which made it increasingly difficult for the non-pirates to afford the rising
living costs. More and more people sunk deeper into poverty and piracy or illegal immigration
became the only option available for increasing number of the able bodied willing to undertake
either of the risky ventures. So, whereas the need for quick money is an undeniable incentive for
many of the youth who joined piracy, claims that it was the relatively well-off who did so33 is not
borne out of the reality on the ground in Puntland. Piracy’s foot soldiers needed quick money
because they lived in abject poverty.34 A lion’s share of these borrowings was, however, spent on
alcohol and the mildly narcotic khat, which had devastating social and security implications that
are discussed below.
4.6. Loss of Job-Creating Opportunities
Like other criminal activities, piracy benefited from the initial problem of joblessness across
Somalia, and particularly in Puntland, and it became the biggest impediment for a solution. The
cascade of economic difficulties that piracy caused directly affected the creation of local jobs,
which in turn made jobless young men available in abundance for recruitment into piracy. As the
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special advisor on piracy to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Jack Lang, accurately
reported in January 2011, the “growing insecurity caused by piracy is depriving the north of
Somalia of possible job-creating investments (port operations, fishing and development of public
infrastructure).”35
This point is exemplified using a recent business venture from a Somali-owned and Kenya-based
company that was trying to resuscitate business ventures that had stalled due to piracy, among
other factors. The company planned to connect Puntland to the fiber optic lines that pass
undersea nearby. The company’s own feasibility study suggested that, everything being equal,
the project would employ thousands of skilled workforce and unskilled laborers, and generate
tens of millions of dollars in revenue. Due to piracy, no shipping company was prepared to
transport all the procured cables and other hardware. At an added cost, the supplies were
transported to Djibouti, where they await to be shipped to Puntland.
Even though piracy has also interfered with other job-creating businesses (active and
prospective), there is no alternative to job creation being a significant part of the solution to
piracy. The majority of people in Puntland partially attributes piracy to joblessness and believes
that job creation is the best solution. In a random survey conducted in February 2012 among
Puntland’s youth in the three major urban centers,36 91 of the 236 respondents (38.5 percent)
thought that youth unemployment was at the root of piracy. And 124 of the same respondents
(52.5 percent) believed job creation to be the best solution.37
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Figure 7: Solutions for Piracy
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Deterioration of Safety and Security, and Draining of Resources

The safety and security of previously peaceful communities suddenly deteriorated immediately
after the advent of pirates on the scene. Their pouring in of unearned cash led to deteriorating
security, worsening erosion of the social and family fabric, and destabilization of the traditional
order that had preserved itself through the years of war. In previously peaceful and least armed
communities, the pirates were armed to the teeth and did not hesitate to use them against each
other and non-pirate local residents alike. The attendant insecurity affected everyone.
The exact statistics of security incidents involving pirates are hard to come by because, among
other factors, pirates choose to settle disputes outside the justice system as represented by state
authorities.38 The combined effects of their activities are, however, inescapable to the naked eye.
A number of other practical and methodological challenges made it difficult to exhaustively
track pirate-caused security incidents. But the few documented cases capture, in broad contours,
the damage that piracy wrought onto the people of Puntland.
In an open group discussion (participatory action research) with Eyl residents about these and
related piracy-related developments, a religious leader from the village of Dacwad in Eyl quietly
mused, “the powerful get angry fast.” He had a near death experience when a pirate fired in his
direction in opposition to his preaching against piracy and pirates. Many other elders and
activists were victims of that anger when pirates shot at them randomly. Even mosques were not
safe as, in at least one incident in Eyl, pirates shot several rounds into the Mosque in order to
stop the anti-piracy sermon on a Friday. A representative of the youth campaigners against
piracy in the historic fishing village related how security had so deteriorated that “our wives
started to miscarry due to extreme fear.”39
The situation was even worse further south, especially when the hub of piracy moved to Mudug
region of Puntland. Pirates, related a high official in the office the regional governor, are into “all
night partying and gun fire…to a point that we assume that every gun shot is pirate-related.
About 99% of traffic accidents are pirate caused: head-on collisions, over-turning, and knocking
down people are among the speeding related accidents”40 In mid-February 2012, a 19-year-old
civilian was killed in Galkacyo in one such pirate shooting during a wedding of one of them. The
police responded and apprehended the shooter only to face multiple challenges. On the one hand,
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the family of the victim wanted to avenge their death and demanded that the killer be handed
over to them as is the custom. On the other hand, the pirates wanted to free their colleague and
twice attacked the police station. This was not the first time that the Galkacyo police came under
similar attacks.
Both pirates and non-pirates similarly characterized the level of pirate-caused disturbances
between the inland town of Galkacyo and the coastal village of Garacad in Mudug region. An
army veteran and ranking police officer in Galkacyo concurred and compared the pirates’
random and wanton shootings to hundreds of simultaneous suicide: “When they marry, they fire
so much ammunition that one thinks a battalion had killed itself.”41 As group consultation with
elders and experienced security personnel went on during that tense Galkacyo afternoon in late
February 2011, gunshots could be heard coming from different corners of the town. Security
disturbances surrounding intra-pirate rivalries or quarrels and drunken commotions were not the
only ills that followed the advent of ransom pirates after 2007.
Never seen before car accidents shocked the locals and contributed to increased injuries and
fatalities. When asked what had happened to his leg, a pirate who had a limp in one of his legs
related the story of his car accident because of his “crazy” driving without prior experience and
went on to advise that nearly all injuries of young men that are not caused by gunfire are due to
car accidents similar to his.
Suddenly ‘enriched’ young men owned flashy sports utility vehicles (SUVs) that were automatic
(as opposed to the harder to drive stick shift). Driving them under the influence of alcohol and
drugs and without prior driving experiences, they caused numerous accidents. A different pirate
admitted how behind the façade of bravado of successful pirates, the horrors of capturing a ship
in the high seas chases the pirates on land. In their delirious high speed race from themselves
they caused many accidents.
Like other security incidents, however, pirate-caused car accidents are hard to nail down
statistically because pirates do not typically wait until their disputes are reported to the police.
However, medical reports give a picture of pirate-caused casualties that have been brought to the
few available medical facilities. When they survive and receive emergency medical attention,
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they sap the medical resources that would otherwise have gone to needy innocent citizens.42
According to information from the Galkacyo Medical Center (GMC), up to 60 percent of that
center’s resources were being used up in treating pirates wounded in car accidents or in intrapirate fights.43 Roughly aggregated data from GMC indicate that that medical facility treated 912
cases involving pirates between 2010 and 2012, more than half of which were gunshot injuries
(pirate and non-pirate). The numbers reported by the Galkacyo General Hospital is even more
staggering as the diagram below demonstrates. But what is jarringly absent in the latter is report
on rape cases and their very limited numbers from GMC: three in 2010, two in 2011, and seven
in 2012.
Figure 8: Incidents (Gunshot, Car Accidents and Rape) in the Mudug Region
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At the heart of nearly all of the violations of social norms, religious prohibitions, security
incidents, and public commotion in the coastal areas – as well as in inland towns – is the massive
consumption of alcohol and drugs by gun slinging and SUV driving pirates. As described by a
one-time notorious pirate, the hours of the day in Garacad are divided into three: khat chewing
during the day, drinking time in the evening, and shooting at night.
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Substance Abuse and Attendant Ills

There is a large structure in the outskirts of the regional capital of Garowe that houses some of
Puntland’s mentally ill. Spearheaded by Mrs. Hawa Ahmed Mohamed who, since 2005,
campaigned against the stigma about and started to care for the mentally ill, the facility was built
with funds raised by Somali Diaspora (in Europe) on land granted by the Puntland government.
Called Garowe Psychiatric Center, the facility catered to more than thirty known pirates who had
drifted off their sanity due to a mix of substance abuse and violence. At the time of the visit in
early February 2012, thirteen former pirates had already been treated and discharged. Of the
forty-nine inpatients who were in the facility at the time, fifteen were former pirates.44 In spite of
Mrs. Hawa’s best efforts and impressive success, however, not only does the stigma remain
pervasive, but also many young Puntlanders irreparably damaged their physical and mental
health through excessive use of drugs, alcohol and brute violence.
Tracking the smuggling and consumption of drugs and alcohol into Somalia has been
particularly difficult because fierce Islamic prohibition drives the illicit trade deep into the
underground even in places where the actual consumption of alcohol is as public as the
participation in the crime of piracy. Discrete telephonic consultations with half dozen alcohol
retailers offer a rough estimate of how many bottles may have been consumed on a daily basis
across Puntland during the heyday of piracy. Accordingly, an estimated 500 bottles were
consumed daily between 2008 and 2009. That figure jumped to over 840 bottles per day in 20092010; and increased by an additional 100 bottles the following year at 945 per day. Noticing the
shock at what were considered as unlikely figures, one telephone informant volunteered to help:
“have you seen pirates drink this poisonous drink? I have!”45 He related other occurrences, some
of which were heard before from activists, government officials and pirates as well, where many
pirates simply drowned an entire bottle of dry gin; and did so as regularly as they could afford
to.46
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Alcohol consumption in Bottles/day

Figure 9: Estimated daily alcohol consumption in Puntland, 2008-2011
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The exorbitant prices that traders and retailers charged did not deter the pirates; nor did the strict
Islamic prohibition of alcohol among an entirely Muslim population. An example is the
Ethiopian gin popular among Somali pirates in coastal areas and towns alike. In the Ethiopian
capital, Addis Ababa, a bottle of Baro’s Dry Gin is retailed at no more than $10. In Garowe and
Galkacyo, it costs an easy $100; and one would be considered lucky to get a bottle after going
through a chain of trusted connections. Not only did that price double in the coastal areas but it
was traded openly and consumed publicly. There were times when a 75cl bottle of gin cost as
much as $500 in the Galkacyo – Garacad corridor.
Equally devastating, and of immediate and long-term physical and mental health effects, is the
parallel excessive consumption of the mildly narcotic stimulant leaf, khat. According to a
fisherman who said he conducted a ‘survey’ with pirates, khat-induced high (or merqan, as it is
locally called) is the last spur that makes pirates get onboard the boats going on piracy missions.
The farther they sail away from the coast, the merqan fades; in its place fear and the desire to
hang on to life with every available thread sets. And the final adrenaline rush and daring to board
a gigantic vessel in the high seas comes from human survivalist urges to escape a dangerously
small boat for the steadiness and safety of the prey. When they come home with a pirated ship,
however, not only does khat calm their anticipation until ransom is paid and keeps them vigilant
– at times for days in a row without any sleep – but it is also consumed in large quantities for
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entertainment purposes to attain a much craved state of euphoric merqan.
The explosion of piracy saw a parallel increase in the consumption – hence sale – of khat across
Puntland and quadrupling of prices. From the 1990s to the first half of the 2000s, a fer (a pack of
five bundles) of Kenyan khat or mirah cost between $1 and $5 in the urban centers.47 By the
mid-2000s, the price jumped to $10 on average, and the latter price doubled by 2009. While it
was not uncommon to see a fer of mirah going for up to $25 in the towns, it is hard to find it for
less than $40 along the coast between Eyl and Garacad. There were times between 2009 and
2012 when a fer of Kenyan khat cost $50. These skyrocketing of prices did not reduce or contain
consumption levels.
Photos: a fer (and its smaller bundles) of Kenyan khat that costs up to $25 in the towns and up to $50 in coastal pirate dens.

According to MOPIC estimates, import of Kenyan meeru and Ethiopian hareeri khat into
Puntland was consistently on the rise and had reached an annual import of 142,944 tons in 2007,
when piracy exploded.48 Many dispute this figure allegedly because imports are not accurately
reported in order to evade taxation. But this estimate gives a picture of what was to come. In the
years that followed, when Galkacyo took the unenviable place of being a pirate hub, that town’s
imports of the Kenyan variety alone nearly equaled the region’s total. According to confidential
data collection from some of the fifteen – or so – khat importers (the bulk traders), small cargo
airplanes flew in from Kenya with a total of 84,320 tons of khat in 2008; 96,425 in 2009;
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108,780 tons in 2010; and 111,410 tons in 2011.
The bulk traders take turns in sharing the 100-sack daily imports with two dividing the imports
one day and another two traders the following day. The two daily importers then
distribute/transport them to their local retailers often times directly but sometime through yet one
level of go-betweens. A sample look into the trends of these traders corroborates the exponential
increase in consumption of khat in spite of parallel skyrocketing of the price. According to one
of them, who claims to have been in the business for well over a decade before the advent of
ransom piracy, his sales ranged between ten and twenty fers during the fishing season - before
piracy. But after piracy, his sales exceeded 300 bundles (i.e. six sacks and more) per day and
business ran year round.
As a lucrative business venture that one can start without capital, women became easily attracted
to khat retailing in spite of the attendant physical and financial dangers, especially worsened by
the kind of their clientele base. Whereas only six of the 51 respondents in Galkacyo and five out
of 34 respondents in Garowe entered that business between 2005 and 2006, 50 percent in
Galkacyo and 64 percent in Garowe started in 2007 and after. The clearing of pirates from
Garowe and emergence of Galkacyo as the principal pirate town in Puntland in 2009 did not alter
the rate of khat consumption or the number of new retailers entering that business: in 2009 and
after, Garowe saw 44 percent increase in retailers while Galkacyo’s retailers increased by 29
percent.
What exacerbates the financial, time, and energy drain associated with the widespread
consumption of the addictive substance is that it is neither illegal nor socially unacceptable.
According to a February 2012 survey among khat retailers (all of whom are women), more than
84 percent of 51 respondents in Galkacyo and 41 percent of those in Garowe said their families
approved or actively supported their business ventures. Family disapprovals (mostly for religious
reasons) did not deter the less than 16 percent in Galkacyo and more than 58 percent in Garowe
from continuing their trade. In fact a respondent in Garowe volunteered to relate that her husband
threatened to divorce her if she did not stop selling khat; and did exactly that up on her refusal to
quit.
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As with most other commodities, khat was sold on credit, which is partially responsible for the
price hikes. The bulk traders in Galkacyo, for example, pay $10 for a bundle of khat at the
Galkacyo airstrip. They then transport it to the coast and sell it between $20 and $25 to the
retailers, who in their turn charge as much as $50 per bundle – often in credit. “I know a single
pirate borrowing as much as $40,000 in khat within a period of 5 – 6 months,” related one trader
and continued, “but you have to know that one person takes care of many [shahat].” Although
not unheard of, defaulting on khat debt is rare mostly because there are mechanisms of clan
protection of one’s commercial interests but also because, as the trader related, “in Galkacyo
there is no forgetting of people who steal from you or abuse you.” But in Galkacyo – as
elsewhere in Puntland or even the rest of Somalia for that matter – there are countless egregious
abuses that very few care to remember and try to do something about it.
4.9. Violated Bodies, Broken Marriages, Fatherless Children
As in many other war torn societies, and especially owing to their unique historic position in
their societies, Somali women continue to carry the heavier burden of their community’s dire
predicament. Piracy added more difficulties to their wretchedness as female members of the
family typically stepped in to fill the void left behind by their either jobless, imprisoned, killed or
disappeared menfolk. All male government officials without fail listed the burden piracy had
proven to be on women across Puntland. But none ventured to give details because, in the words
of one official, “we cannot probe that point further because it is a taboo!”
Women in government and in NGOs have been more forthcoming to speak of women’s
conditions after the eruption of ransom piracy. But even they spoke in generalities because they
face many practical difficulties in giving specifics. An activist and leader of the Somali Women
Vision perhaps best captured the difficulty of finding the exact details of broken marriages,
fatherless children and countless cases of rape: “when we call on victims to share their
experiences with us, their responses is: ‘yes I have experienced this or that but what will you do
for me.’ or ‘I am now raising his children because their mother could not raise them and so
abandoned them to me…are you going to help me raise his children?’”49
In a random survey conducted among 28 women in Garowe, and 50 in Galkacyo, 95 percent of
the respondents said that piracy negatively affected women – economically, emotionally and
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physically. The effects include the loss of husbands and sons, dissolution of temporary marriages
(divorces), rape, torture, and killings. More interestingly, 43 percent of the respondents in
Garowe said they had either a daughter, niece, close relative or close friend who had been
affected thus. “One of my daughters married a pirate at the age of 16,” volunteered one
respondent, “after ten days, he divorced her and she was pregnant.” Another respondent related
how one of the pirates “married my young sister, two months later, he was captured [and he is
imprisoned] now in Seychelles.”
Prostitution exploded with the spiraling of ransom piracy in previously self-restrained coastal
communities. Increasing numbers of women and girls from other regions of Somalia and from
neighboring countries were trafficked in and pimped to constantly intoxicated pirates. That
undermined the morals of devout, conservative Muslims and offended the sensibilities of the
more tolerant ones. As if the practice itself was not offensive enough to the majority of local
women, repeated violations against the sex workers added insult to injury.
Any discussion of the condition of women in general and the sex workers in particular is
abounded with horrifying ordeal that explains why many self-respecting, devout religious men
and women choose not to discuss. Only a few pirates dared to relate with regret (genuine or not)
their experiences or what they say is the experience of their colleagues.
Another particular group of victims of pirate violence has been internally displaced Somalis,
living in camps on the outskirts of the main towns or along the highway connecting them. The
majority of the communities in Puntland were least affected by the civil war that bedeviled the
rest of Somalia. As a result they were able to not only engage in peaceful and productive
businesses but they also received back their kin fleeing the civil war and hosted other internally
displaced populations (IDPs) belonging to Darod clan or to ethnic minorities. While the dire
living conditions of these IDPs left them more susceptible to the allure of the pirates’
extravaganza of spending, their lack of protection of a close-knit family-clan made them
vulnerable to the pirates’ exploitation and abuse.
Typically located in the outskirts of the main towns, these camps became realms of exclusive
pirate anarchy with unknown number of abductions, rape, and shootings, involving injuries and
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even deaths of the internally displaced. Only during the day did government officials in the town
of Galkacyo, for example, visit the camps on the edges of town to distribute food aid and other
supplies. Even then, they faced intimidation from better-armed and -equipped pirates who acted
as if they were in turf war with a rival gang. On February 24, 2012, a courtesy call on the Mudug
regional police Headquarters was met by the Deputy Governor of the region who had just
returned from such a visit to one of the IDP camps in the outskirts of Galkacyo to distribute
supplies. He related his experience thus: “A car of armed pirates pulled over, brandishing their
guns the pirates lowered their tinted windows.”50 It was turf war that the authorities partook in
offensively in their own terms as discussed later in this report.
4.10. Children in Piracy
A troubling phenomenon that has so far received little to no attention is the involvement of
underage children in piracy. Wherever they went pirates set bad example for the young and many
underage children joined the pirate ranks. School dropouts from the towns, nomads from the
expansive interior and coastal residents under the age of 18 have played various roles from
boarding vessels in the high seas to securing captured ships in inshore waters to transporting
supplies from land to the captured ships and being ‘errand boys’ for pirate kingpins.
Children between the ages of 15 and 17 years are considered ideal candidates for pirate boarding
teams as well as for security on the ground. According to an investor and organizer/recruiter,
children in this age bracket are sufficiently mature to obey orders to the letter and know the
consequences of not doing so. Yet they are sufficiently gullible that leaves them blissfully
ignorant of the real risk they face in the open ocean when they are part of a boarding team. Once
in it, however, they are sufficiently agile to accomplish the reckless physical feats of boarding
gigantic ships from fast-moving, unstable, tiny skiffs. As security teams on the ground or in the
coastal waters, they do not negotiate with hostages or rival groups. Children under the age of 15
years are, however, considered too young to entrust one’s investments (that goes into capturing a
vessel in the high seas or securing a captured one in the inshore waters). But they are ideal as
errand boys on land or for transporting supplies to the captured vessels in the nearby waters.
There is, however, no evidence of forced recruitment of such children partially because the
overwhelming poverty and lawlessness not only made them available in abundance but also
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willing to take part in risky enterprises. Moreover, the years of strife eroded the protective family
fabric and parental authority that helps mitigate child exposure to dangerous influences and
manipulation.51 Conversation with several underage pirates revealed that they had in fact insisted
on joining piracy against the advice of their kinsmen by threatening to join other groups if their
own relatives did not allow them to. Such misplaced enthusiasm of the young and the absence of
coercion do not make their involvement any less of an exploitation of child labor and their
exposure to danger in order to profit adult pirate kingpins – violations of clearly stipulated
protections of the child in international law.52
4.11. Erosion of Values and Destabilization Traditional Authority of Elders
Piracy has had far-reaching effect on the role of elders and traditional authority across Somalia.
Lamenting the erosion of traditional system, many elders in Puntland consulted for this project
blamed pirates for their violations of religious prohibitions and perversion of traditional norms
and social values. Generally, however, the overall authority of titled traditional elders and elected
local officials were compromised when some of their ranks defended local pirates – either
because they were corrupted with piracy money or because of family ties – so that the
community does not attack or expel them.
The same age-old mechanisms of managing intra-clan and -sub-clan conflicts that the pirates
manipulated in their favor generally restrained local pirates from violently responding to
outspoken local elders opposed to their criminal activities. When Garacad elders stated that they
could walk straight up to a local pirate – armed or not – to slap him for misbehaving they may
not have exaggerated their own experiences.53 But there are far too many exceptions to such an
assertion of traditional authority. In a typical example of such exceptions, in late 2011 a truck of
a businessman got into fender-bender with a pirate’s sports utility vehicle. Without any
consideration of whose fault it may have been, the pirate threatened to kill that businessman
should the latter not replace the slightly scratched land cruiser with a ‘new one’: “he threatened
me saying ‘do you know how I got this? I spilled a man’s blood for it and I am prepared to spill
more blood!’ No one could do anything about it.” The businessman appealed to the father of the
pirate who gave him an exasperated look of having long lost control over his child.54
Moreover, the pirate dens in Puntland hosted – and in some cases still do – Somalis distantly
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related or completely unrelated to the native clans/sub-clans. The distance – or the absence – of
ancestral/familial ties between pirates and the host communities undermined the limited deterrent
function that clan, sub-clan and family ties served. As such, pirates from other clans and regions
much more easily resorted to violence against anyone standing on their way – traditional elders,
government officials or community activists in their base of operations.
Traditional methods of conflict resolution – especially involving deaths have particularly been
put to the test. Some Mejerten sub-clans neither accepted nor offered blood money until the
advent of ransom piracy. They typically avenged their deaths on those who killed one of their
own. When their member killed someone else, they delivered the killer to the family of the
victim for the latter to do with the killer what they may. Nevertheless, the explosion of piracy
compelled them to reconsider because a large number of their members got involved in piracy
and in staggering number of piracy-related deaths. Nowadays and especially in piracy cases, not
only do they accept blood money without asking for the perpetrator alive, but they also offer
their victims blood money. According to a high-ranking security official, when “a pirate kills
another pirate, the clan of the deceased goes to the clan of the culprit and demands diya,” 55
especially among previously diya (blood money) exchanging groups. As if coming up with the
standard number of camels in blood money (typically 100 heads) were not difficult enough, it
was not uncommon for pirates to easily pay double that amount in cash. The long-term effect of
that is raising blood money or, in cases when people are unable to pay up, exacting revenge and
perpetuating the cycle of violence.
4.12. Pirate-Caused Clan Conflicts
With the erosion of traditional authority, the elders’ management of conflicts was also
challenged. Like other elders across Puntland, traditional leaders in Bari region agreed to treat
piracy-related deaths as non-eligible for blood money or settlement through the diya system. But
pirates in the region couched their greed-generated conflicts in clan terms and stocked conflict
between the Ali Saleban and Muse Saleban (also known as Ugar Saleban) sub-sub-clans of the
Mejerten. The three-year-long conflict cost dozens of lives (pirate and non-pirate), many more
injuries, and loss of property and opportunities.56
The bloody outbursts of violence centered around the notorious Ali Saleban pirate leader, Isse
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Yuluh, who had been collaborating with pirates hailing from the neighboring Muse Saleban.
Convinced that his Muse Saleban partners in crime cheated him during the splitting of a ransom
in early 2009, Yuluh went on a shooting rampage against the former. Failing to gain the
sympathy of his clansmen and mobilize them in his defense against an imminent revenge from
the Muse Saleban, he allegedly ambushed a random commercial transporter of his rivals in
territory of the Ali Saleban, killing several and turning the conflict into one based on clan
families. Joined by pirates on both sides, the two clan-families mobilized their respective militias
and violently confronted each other.57
Previously peaceful transitional territories between the two groups, their shared grazing lands
and neighboring villages turned into active fighting grounds for the following three years until
the final showdown of mid-November 2011. 58 At a place called Labida (between Rako and
Qodax), the two sides faced off, leaving more than a dozen dead and many more injured. “The
battleground was too dangerous,” wrote PDRC researcher Abdinasir Yusuf, “that for the
following 4 days the corpses and the injured could not be accessed.” Outraged by the carnage
and the subsequent inhumanity, elders from across Puntland spontaneously mobilized to mediate.
Led by Sultan Said Mohamed Garase, the more than fifty elders injected themselves between the
warring sides, camped at the very battlegrounds of Labida, buried the dead, dispatched the
injured for medical attention, and started a mediation process that took months to settle the
dispute.59 Meanwhile, the Puntland Marine Police Force (PMPF) chased Yuluh and his men from
one hub to the next.60
Yuluh and his likes are able to plunge their communities into extended conflicts and cause much
hardship inland because of the ransom that they succeeded to gather at sea. The ill-gotten money
enabled them to procure varied arsenal of heavy and light weapons. 61 Other pirate leaders
elsewhere in Puntland have been more cautious in their resort to violence than has Yuluh, but
have nonetheless amassed a large cache of weaponry to form a new kind of warlords flexing
their muscle in pursuit of personal or group interests of one sort or another. The ease with which
moneyed individuals and groups can procure weapons speaks to the vibrancy of the arms black
market in Somalia in general and Puntland in particular. Although beyond the scope of this
report, it is important to note that the alarming proliferations of arms that particularly afflicts
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Puntland not only bodes ill to that region’s long-term stability but it also takes place in violation
of two-decade-old United Nations arms embargo.62
4.13. International Counter-Piracy
In the early hours of May 1, 2011, three known fishermen from Eyl (Abdulgadir Al-Nur
“Dadurow”, Nur Mursel Mohamed and a third fisherman) went fishing as they did nearly seven
days a week. They were never to be seen again. A week into their disappearance, Mayor Musa
Osman Yusuf of Eyl telephoned Puntland Counter-piracy Director General Abdirizak Mohamed
Dirir in Garowe to inquire.63 The DG called his contacts in NATO’s counter-piracy force, who
told him that they had no knowledge of any incident involving fishermen around Eyl. 64 Residents
of Bedey (the coastal half of Eyl) similarly made frantic calls to their contacts along the entire
coastline until five days later the body of “Dadurow” washed up the beach at Gabac.
With one hand clipped to the opposite leg and his back riddled with bullet holes, Dadurow’s
misconfigured body was discovered on the beach of Gabac in the morning of May 13, 2011. The
villagers identified the body, sent the bad news to the village of the deceased and immediately
buried the body due to its fragility and in accordance with Islamic tradition. 65 His wife and four
boys and a girl aged between 4 and 15 years, who survived him found closure.66 But the families
of the two other fishermen were not as fortunate.
Nur Mursel and the third fisherman are presumed to have met the same fate as Dadurow. Nur
Mursel left behind a wife and two children under two years of age, the youngest of whom was
one week old when Nur Mursel went on that fateful fishing trip.67 During a visit in February
2012, the two widows and their orphaned children still lived in the same rundown shacks by the
water surrounded by the spare fishing gear of their late breadwinners.
Even though there are not enough such cases to establish a pattern and identify who may be
behind these kinds of atrocities, sources privy to the grisly details of many such tragic incidents
have indicated that they observe a pattern, pointing to specific foreign navies in Somali waters.
In July 2011, a warship, purportedly Danish, allegedly ran over an artisanal fishing boat near
Bosaso, injuring the entire crew. The fishermen were not far from the coast and managed to send
an SOS to their contacts on land, who rushed to their rescue. Similarly in late March 2012 an
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unidentified warship attacked a Yemeni-registered, Somali-owned fishing vessel, Al-Qanim, and
killed two of the ten Somali crew before letting the rest proceed with their journey back to
Bosaso, the fishing boat’s base of operations.68 Like the scores of fishermen and officials related,
Puntland Minister of Maritime Transportation and Ports, Said Mohamed Raghe confirmed to
SomaliaReport that such killings were not uncommon.
Treating piracy as a threat to global peace, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1816
authorized member states with the interest in suppressing piracy and have the capacity to do so to
enter “the territorial waters of Somalia” and “use…all necessary means to repress acts of piracy
and armed robbery” at sea. 69 Shortly afterwards, unilateral and multilateral counter-piracy
flotillas followed each other in quick succession. Acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter, global superpowers, regional aspirants and countries seeking to make a mark of their
presence or demonstrate their commitment to their respective regional pacts rushed their
warships to protect their interests – some far-fetched. NATO expanded the mandate of its forces
to counter-piracy and to protect WFP vessels. For its part, the European Union dispatched an
unprecedented naval force, EU NAVFOR Operation ATALANTA, to escort vessels transporting
humanitarian assistance to Somalia.70
According to the Security Council document, such a robust but at the same time loose
international mandate was authorized after the weak Transition Federal Government of
Abdullahi Yusuf asked for it through a letter of its Permanent Representative dated 27 February
2008.71 But not all Somalis are supportive of international naval presence that have done little to
nothing to contain IUU fishing but have resorted to methods that are at best questionable.
Perhaps tellingly, of 236 respondents in a February 2012 survey among Somali youth in
Puntland, only six (2.5 percent) believed that continued and strengthened presence of EU and
NATO warships could solve the problem of piracy. Such an overwhelming local rejection of the
international navies despite their declared noble intentions is not without practical reasons, as we
will see shortly.
Nevertheless, the European Union extended the operational mandate of its ATALANTA
taskforce to the Somali beaches and their immediate hinterlands. They have accordingly
launched several pre-emptive aerial and naval operations that Somali civilians claimed to have
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wrongly targeted them. 72 To make matters worse, the advent of unregulated profiteering
military/security companies added to the mire. With little uniformity, discipline and
accountability, the widespread deployment of private military solutions in the Gulf of Aden and
northwestern Indian Ocean further militarizes the fragile region in near complete disregard of the
lot of innocent Somalis.73 Under pressure from powerful ship-owners, business communities and
international seafarers’ associations demanding a green light for a robust response in kind, the
International Maritime Organization (IMO) removed one of the last restraints against the already
mushrooming private maritime security industry.74 On May 20, 2011, it took the unprecedented
step of tacitly approving the use of armed guards onboard ships to fight off pirates by issuing
guidance and recommendations on how to do so.75
Somali fishermen have lamented their lot in the hands of the international and private anti-piracy
forces – as they did about pirates, as discussed above. An unknown number of fishermen have
been killed, others whisked off to overseas jails, and many more disappeared without a trace.
Foreign national, international and private anti-piracy missions have repeatedly failed to identify
pirates from non-pirates with deadly consequences to innocent fishermen at sea and civilians on
land.
As many Somalis are quick to point out, such targeting preceded widespread misperception that
all Somalis were either directly involved in piracy or benefited from it. Awad Yare, a fisherman
in Bargal told SomaliaReport that ever since “pirates started hijacking boats… everyone thinks
even we are pirates…we have been having so much trouble, some international vessels have
poured boiling water onto out boats and destroying boats which can cause injuries and even
death.”76 Another fisherman in Lasqorey related how their making a daily living left them in
fear: “We are scared of both pirates and the international navies. We are scared that naval forces
will arrest us because they are suspecting we are pirates.” 77 The incidence of fishermen getting
killed or wrongfully arrested by international or private anti-piracy forces is likely to be high due
to the fact that international commercial and military navies are active in the richer fishing
grounds off the Somali coast. Having either overfished the inshore waters or lost in competition
with the illegal foreign industrial fishers, Somali fishermen have been trying their luck in more
open waters and risk being targeted by the anti-piracy flotilla and the private armed guards
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onboard or escorting commercial vessels.
Somali fishermen have also fallen victim to Western counter-terrorism operations along the
Somali coastlines. That was especially the case after August 2011 when Al-Shabab sought to
reposition itself in northeastern parts of the Somali region following its streak of losses in southcentral Somalia that culminated in its pulling out of Mogadishu. In late 2011, intelligence
sources suspected that a group of high profile foreigners close to Al-Shabab top leaders was
moving toward Puntland, possibly with the intention of crossing over to Yemen. As a result,
between January and March 2012, any boat seen moving along the suspected Somali coastline
became a target of Western counterterrorism operations in the Horn of Africa. According to one
source, half a dozen fishing boats were, in the process, hit with laser weapons that dug holes in
the base of the boats causing them to capsize.
Besides the innocent victims of international anti-piracy operations, Somali pirates killed in the
act are so far unaccounted for. By 2010, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) estimated that 200 to 300 pirates had disappeared after leaving on pirate missions.78
While a few hundreds are enough figures to generate a serious news storm in any society and
more so in oral societies, all local estimates coupled with experience from traveling across
Puntland suggest that the above figures are minuscule. A short field trip to Garacad in November
2012 found the one-time pirate hub abuzz with anticipation about the whereabouts of their loved
ones. But what makes it impossible to establish a credible number of pirate deaths in the high
seas – and give their families a closure – is the absence of “official reporting on the numbers of
Somalis killed by navy and coast guard personnel or by armed private security” in spite of
military forces being required to report them. 79 In May 2010, for example, the Russian antipiracy flotilla captured ten suspected Somali pirates and set them adrift in a raft without supplies
and navigation; they are presumed dead.80
Pirates killed during rescue operations or in retaliatory raids have also gone unreported. On
January 21, 2011, The Guardian reported that a South Korean rescue operation left eight pirates
dead.81 Isolated French and Indonesian retaliatory raids have also killed an unknown number of
pirates.82 Later in mid-May 2011, “a U.S. naval helicopter opened fire on a pirate skiff as it was
attacking a boat, likely killing all pirates onboard, and departed without verifying the condition
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of the pirates.”83
In her report for the Oceans Beyond Piracy project, Kaija Hurlburt assembled these and other
publicly available data for the first half of 2011 alone to find out that more than 60 pirates had
reportedly been killed in the act. But that figure does not take into account the unreported
killings of pirates and that of those who are lost at sea. She rightly pointed out that the
application of “consistent principles of law when dealing with both perpetrators and victims of
criminal acts,”84 requires that all piracy-related injuries and fatalities be accounted for. Doing so
can also serve a more effective deterrent function by showing foot soldiers and potential recruits
of the real costs of involvement in this criminal act. As it stands, there is little to no possibility of
establishing the exact number of such incidents. As a result, there is no way that accidental
deaths or injuries of Somali fishermen in the high seas as well as disappearances of pirates (that
do not involve action of third parties) can be identified and isolated.
This is particularly important because the diminishing catch in inshore waters had initially
compelled increasing numbers of artisanal fishermen to sail farther into the ocean for better
catch. In doing so, however, they exposed themselves to several dangers: first their old, small
and poorly constructed fishing crafts made them vulnerable to natural hazards in the strong
waves of the open waters of the ocean. Second, the international navies as well as the armed IUU
fishing vessels generally operate in the richer fishing grounds of the artisanal fishermen. In light
of the lacking clarity of mandate, operational uniformity, transparency and accountability of
national, coalition and private counter-piracy forces that are operating in what would be
considered Somali territorial waters, every disappearance in the high seas is convincingly
relegated to the evil actions of the anti-piracy forces and of IUU fishers. With little to no
communication of these forces with the Somalis, few cases among an oral society are enough to
create an atmosphere whereby the exception – if these are in fact exceptions – become the rule in
the eyes of the Somali people. As a result, many fishermen remain too fearful to fish in the
relatively richer fishing grounds within Somalia’s waters.
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Local Counter-Piracy Responses

As early as 2008, many residents of coastal fishing communities across Puntland started raising
questions about and protesting against the hijacking of commercial vessels and hostage taking of
their crew – on religious and humanitarian grounds. The pirates’ excesses only confirmed the
grounds for these initial mutterings. Pirates undermined social values, violated religious
prohibitions, destabilized communities that had lived in relative peace, and threatened their
future by setting bad examples for their children. Thus awakened to the peril of piracy taking
place in their midst – and intensifying – the coastal communities started to openly object to pirate
presence in their areas and mobilize support of everyone in their communities.
But their objections to and mobilization against piracy did not have immediate tangible results. A
number of inter-related factors impeded their efforts’ traction, but did not permanently scuttle
them. The overall weakness of the regional government in Garowe was a principal impediment.
Besides the worst financial crisis it faced, Cade Muse’s government was paralyzed during its
final days due to, among other things, allegations of involvement in piracy and kidnappings, the
deadlock between him seeking an extension of his term in office and the Puntland legislature
fiercely denying him that “even by a single day,” as his successor, President Abdirahman
Mohamed Mohamoud “Farole”, insisted then. Consequently, the coastal district councils,
through which Garowe exercised what little authority it could, were either weak or their terms
lapsed and the government was too distracted to renew them or they simply did not exist.
Moreover, the repertoire of pirate leveraging over their willing and increasingly unwilling host
communities ranged from invoking clan and family ties, hence protection, to corrupting local
elders, and threatening to resort – and in many cases actually resorting – to violence. Besides the
abundance of cash that the local communities could not match, residents of coastal piracy
hotspots would never fail to point out that the pirates were heavily armed while the local
communities were either unarmed or could not match that of the pirates. The latter were little
moved – if at all – by pleas and reasoning of the early anti-piracy activists. However weak, the
existence and active participation of a regional government were as vital for the success of
Somali counter-piracy initiatives as was the sensitization and mobilization of the majority of the
population. The two filled the regional and grassroots governance vacuums necessary to contain

DMPP: When Elephants Fight, the Grass Suffers: A report on the Local Consequences of Piracy in Puntland

38

and eradicate piracy.
5.1.

Initiatives of the Successive Regional Governments

In spite of understandable local and international suspicion of and impatience with the pace of
Puntland authorities’ action against piracy, in hindsight the successive governments did make
modest efforts in the right direction. Importantly, the Farole government made strategic moves
upon taking the helm in Garowe between late 2008 and early 2009. The president is credited by
supporters and opponents alike for restoring a semblance of order in the regional capital, taking
guns off the streets, and pushing the pirates out of town through negotiation and at times by
force. His administration simultaneously reinstated the district council in his home area of Eyl,
whose term had lapsed during the final days of Cade Muse. Led by the mayor and deputy mayor,
who were elected by their community for their staunch anti-piracy activism, the resuscitation of
the Eyl district council was a corner stone for a pirate-free Garowe – Eyl corridor. Although the
Garowe – Bosaso route was not under threat, clearing the vital commercial capital, the port city
of Bosaso, was more difficult and remained at best incomplete.
During a tense fieldwork in pirate-infested Galkacyo in early 2012, every consulted government
official and security personnel stated that “however heavily armed, pirates would not stand and
fight five determined police officers who confront them.” But before the government could move
south toward Galkacyo, a different existential threat emerged in the north to sap Garowe’s
limited forces and attention. Intensifying international pressure on Al-Shabab in south and
central Somalia culminated in its eventual withdrawal from Mogadishu in August 2011 – and
loss of Kismayo a year later. When the streak of loses set in, Al-Shabab rotated some of its
resources and leaders to the harsh terrain of northern Puntland’s mountainous region, namely the
Galgala Mountains of Bari region. Farole’s government doubled the efforts of his predecessor
Cade Muse in combating Al-Shabab. The Bosaso area experienced one of Puntland’s most
aggressive counter-piracy operations precisely because of the danger that the specter of nexus
between the two posed. In the southern part, however, especially in Puntland’s Mudug region
and the town of Galkacyo, numerous interviews and informal consultations with Puntland’s
active and non-active security and intelligence personnel indicate that counter-piracy remained a
distant secondary concern so long as Al-Shabab remained a threat in the north and the pirates in
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the south maintained a comfortable distance from them.
The successive Puntland governments had experimented with different security solution to the
problem progressively culminating in the Abdirahman Farole Administration training hundreds
of Marine Police Force (PMPF). Under pressure from Garowe-based civil society organizations,
the Cade Muse government contemplated an anti-piracy defense strategy that a consortium of
local NGOs prepared. That plan envisaged the setting up of nine coastal bases from Las Qoray to
Garacad each with two speedboats, three technicals and about 100 soldiers with the aim of both
disrupting pirate operations before launching and intercepting them at sea in the event that they
succeed to set sail. At an estimated monthly cost of $300,000, the proposal was for Puntland to
cover 40 percent on its own and seek external assistance for the remaining 60 percent. 85
Distracted by other concerns and failing to garner support for its proposed counter-piracy force,
the Cade Muse government made feeble and haphazard attempt to fight pirates with government
forces falling back after encountering the least resistance from the pirates. In the end, many welltrained and -armed soldiers ended up joining the pirates upon the government’s failure to pay
their salaries for months on end.
The Farole government adopted a similar plan and secured private funding for its
implementation. In late 2010, a “friendly” country in the Middle East – latterly discovered to be
UAE or at least a member of its royal families – quietly paid for Saracen International – or its
affiliate – to train a 1,000 strong marine force recruited by the Puntland government. In spite of
UN Security Council call on the TFG and regional governments to beef up their security toward
combating piracy,86 Puntland’s attempt to do so drew unfavorable attention for reasons unrelated
to Puntland or its counter-piracy initiative.87 Although Garowe officially suspended the contract,
Saracen operations went on under different guises until reportedly taken over by the Washington
DC based Bancroft Global Development.88
Meanwhile, in early December 2010, the Puntland government decreed that piracy was a
punishable crime and empowered the weak region judiciary to prosecute suspected pirates and
their accomplices.89 And, while the international squabbling over who was training whom went
on, the regional government set up the highly mobile and formidable Puntland Marine Police
Force (PMPF) that actively pursued pirates militarily and took the captured suspects to court.
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Between December 2010 and February 2012, more than 700 suspects were brought to court, over
250 of whom received prison sentences ranging between five and ten years.90 One of the main
destinations for these long-term prisoners related to piracy is the Bosaso maximum security
facility that was holding more than 100 inmates above its limited capacity, during the visit in
February 2012. Of the prison’s 390 inmates, 270 were pirates doing time – a limited number of
these had been handed over by international forces.91
Besides their own challenges due to meager resources, limited space, and lack of trained
personnel to adequately examine evidence and successfully prosecute, those captured by foreign
warships are reportedly handed over to them without any supporting evidence to prove that the
apprehended were pirates.92 The attorney general lamented the international community’s lack of
sufficient interest in assisting with badly needed resources to combat piracy on the legal and
custodial aspect of the battle: “We want to partner with the world to get facilities, funding, and
technical trainings… to fight piracy. But when we come to see the world is not responsible [or
responding], we have not given up. I assure you that over 90 percent of it has been eliminated.”93
PMPF negotiated with coastal district councils to establish bases in former pirate hubs or piracy
prone natural harbors and had by early 2012 established five bases along the coast, succeeded in
disrupting piracy missions and chasing pirates out of several hubs. Its effectiveness
notwithstanding, PMPF found itself caught in an ironic vise between an international community
expecting Puntland to eradicate piracy and at the same time apprehensive of its growing capacity
to do so.
Working with local communities, religious leaders and titled elders to push back against the
pirates in vast parts of the region, the government preserved itself for a large-scale and decisive
armed action against the pirates in Galkacyo. That came in June 2012 when pirates either
surrendered in return for amnesty or were captured and jailed or fled away from government
reach. The government’s success was sealed with its rescue of the MV Iceberg I in December
2012. After several rounds of negotiations failed, several of the crew members died, and more
than 30 months of captivity, PMPF and presidential bodyguard unit directly attacked the pirates
holding MV Iceberg I on what they conveniently called as humanitarian rescue. Upon the failure
of the first onslaught, government forces blocked the pirates’ supply of logistics and ammunition
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until the pirates capitulated on the second attempt by the government forces.
5.2.

The Grassroots’ Earliest Initiatives and Enduring Leadership

Government initiatives relied on the active leadership and accomplishments of the coastal
communities. Several inter-related developments took place after 2007 that fully awakened
coastal communities to the peril of piracy taking place in their midst. The combined effect of
pirates undermining social and religious values of the local communities, disturbing their
security, setting bad examples to their children, and defaulting on their debts cost the pirates
what little sympathy and nearly all business relations they had had with the local communities.
All these developments in turn helped accelerate piracy. Many coastal communities started
organized campaigns as early as 2008 with Eyl leading the charge.
Having initially supported the attacks against illegal trawlers, the majority of Eyl’s residents
watched as unscrupulous groups hijacked their legitimate defense and turned it into a lucrative,
criminal enterprise. At that point, the majority of the people stopped supporting them but, as the
mayor of Eyl put it, “once the pirates became rich and powerful we [the ordinary people] were
held hostage.” 94 Shaking themselves off that grip took time because it required cultivating
common views through awareness-raising before using extreme measures. “First,” said the local
religious scholar, “we recognized that we could not fight them militarily. They had guns and a lot
of ransom money. So we … mobilized school children and women and mobilized the public to
chant and carry banners so that [the pirates] could see the public response. We also made
sermons in the mosques.”95 Such campaigns were badly needed because many of piracy’s foot
soldiers were unaware that their trade was a crime and it involved grave danger.
Two elderly fishermen between Garacad and Kulub had related in passing how many ordinary
pirates thought that piracy was one more legitimate line of work. Sure enough, a pirate
recruiter/organizer and investor in Galkacyo said that such candidates were their top choices for
attack missions: “the least educated and most physically fit, who cannot even tell the difference
between a warship and a normal ship,” as he put it. And two of the three pirates interviewed at
the Bosaso maximum-security prison confirmed that they did not know that piracy was a crime
according to secular and Islamic laws.
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Eyl residents who led the charge were not alone. Religious and secular traditional leaders from
across the region aided the efforts of Eyl’s grassroots mobilization directly in person or on the
radio. To begin with, the late Mufti of Puntland, Sheikh Abdulkadir Nur Farah gave several radio
sermons that showed how piracy was haram according to the Qur’an. Whereas those messages
were favorably received by many, the highest titled traditional leader of the Isse Mohamud, Islan
Isse, traveled from Garowe and threw his weight behind the counter-piracy awareness raising
campaigns, as did many others. The overall outcome of these peaceful attempts was so
successful that the notorious pirate leader Abshir Boyah renounced piracy and became a lead
counter-piracy campaigner. Similarly, in one such mobilization in Eyl, in May 2009, hundreds of
pirates collectively renounced piracy.
Awareness-raising thus proved to be an effective tool in the hands of anti-piracy campaigners
across Puntland. Researchers and campaigners from the Puntland Developments Research Center
(PDRC) traversed the territory – including Eyl and Garacad during their worst days of pirate
activity – to sensitize residents to the dangers of piracy, by showing foreign and in-house
documentaries about and video footages of captures and burnings in the high seas. The residents
repeatedly expressed shock at their blissful ignorance of the mechanics and brut violence that
deprived them of their children because the latter wrongfully got involved.96
More than the number of pirates it won out of piracy, the pressure from the highest religious and
traditional authorities of the land undercut the protection that corrupt local elders offered pirates.
As a last resort, Eyl grassroots activists formed armed vigilantes and physically confronted the
pirates.97 Without the backing or intercession of the elders whom they had in their pockets, many
of the pirates vacated Eyl and went south toward Garacad. Forewarned to cease and desist, the
rest quietly went underground.98
Shortly afterwards in 2009, residents of Bandar Bayla started to organize against both the
international resource pirates and the local ransom pirates, with much more success in the latter
case than in the former. As recently as January 2012, the community’s peaceful pleading with
IUU fishers has been responded to with a hail of bullets that threw the unarmed protestors back
to shore. Upon the pirates’ refusal to heed the people’s entreating, however, the latter took up
arms and confronted the pirates to either end their trade or vacate their areas.99 According to a

DMPP: When Elephants Fight, the Grass Suffers: A report on the Local Consequences of Piracy in Puntland

43

high-ranking district official in Bandar Bayla, Puntland government forces came to the aid of the
local vigilantes who had started to physically confront the pirates. After pirates refused to heed
the government official’s repeated request for the release of dozens of Yemeni hostages, the
decisive battle of Hul (about 15km from Bandar Bayla) ensued in March 2011. Local anti-piracy
vigilantes came from the sea and government troops from land. Six government soldiers got
killed in the process but all the hostages were rescued unharmed and were handed over to the
Somali ambassador in Yemen.100 When the district administration made a public announcement
of the ultimatum it had served another pirate group to release their Norwegian hostages or face
an attack, Norwegian authorities reportedly pressured the Puntland government to hold off the
attack, expedited the negotiations, and paid the ransom that the pirates had demanded for the
release of the hostages.101
Garacad, the last stronghold of pirates in Puntland was similarly cleared of pirates. Spearheaded
by a group of returned Diaspora and local activists, residents of Jarriban District mobilized
against piracy and quickly pointed their guns at the pirates. “Eyl was a role model for us,” said
one of the activists – a Somali-American native of Garacad. What is perhaps ironic, yet has
proven effective was that the local communities in the district sought the assistance of their own
kin in piracy to contain the pirates’ excesses on land. Even active pirates who hailed from that
region contributed generously toward a fledgling police force to impose a semblance of order.
Jarriban raised its own funds to enlist 300 armed policemen (at a monthly rate of $300 per
policeman) for a period of a year and half that was lapsing during the final leg of this fieldwork
(December 2012). The impending exhaustion of those funds left the District Mayor weary of
what would happen after the 300 local security personnel are disbanded for lack of funds.
While all these moves helped ostracize many pirates, the active role that women played in the
anti-piracy mobilization marked the death knell of pirate operations in former pirate hubs.
Women in Eyl, for example, organized and staged demonstrations – along with men – shouting
on the pirates to leave them alone. Perhaps most effectively women’s local businesses – and
especially women food vendors – refused to do business with pirates.102 Their counterparts in
Garacad also joined their menfolk in anti-piracy mobilizations. During the heated days of
confronting the pirates in February/March 2012, some women even carried guns and marched to
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the beaches alongside the men.
Many Puntland government officials, lower-level local administrators, activists and ordinary
citizens in towns and coastal villages said confidently that they knew how to deal with the
pirates, only if the international community gave them the opportunity and followed their lead in
pursuit of land-based solutions. “The international navies should learn from us,” said one district
official who led the local anti-piracy campaign. “We have defeated the pirates without heavy
weapons; and so we consider ourselves more powerful,” he added half joking. Still ongoing
awareness campaign by religious leaders, titled traditional elders, elected office holders, and an
array of activist groups persuaded many pirates to abandon piracy, dissuaded many young men
from joining pirate groups, encouraged parents to refuse to marry their daughters to pirates, and
warned young women of the real risks of marrying pirates. The above brief account demonstrates
that Somali assertions of their capability to accomplish the task are not farfetched. These antipiracy efforts have so far evicted pirates from Bandar Bayla in the north to Garacad in the south.
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Inward Turn of Pirates and Local Criminality

Many Puntlanders did not harbor illusions about the multifaceted challenges that awaited them
after they defeat piracy. An official in the Puntland Ministry of Fisheries and Marine Resources
in Bosaso best articulated that awareness of the cold, hair-raising reality ahead: “We know that
once we clear the pirates from the sea, they will turn against us on land. At that point, the
international community won’t come to our aide. But we know how to deal with them at that
point as well.”103 Barely five months had passed when pirates turned inwards in full force and
started kidnappings, robbery and carjacking in towns and rural areas alike.
As many pirates either quit piracy of their own volition or were forced by local and international
pressure to stop their criminal trade, petty crime and associated vandalism have been on the rise.
Equally alarming and of long-term consequence to local and regional stability is the emergence
of organized criminal networks with reaches beyond Somalia itself, mainly into Kenya and
Ethiopia.
On June 29, 2012 kidnappers penetrated deep into Kenyan territory and abducted four foreign
aid workers at the Dadaab refugee camp.104 Various government officials and ordinary citizens
repeatedly stated that the abductors were pirates who fled the Puntland government’s anti-piracy
offensive earlier that month. The fleeing pirates briefly found refuge in Al-Shabab controlled
territories in southern Somalia before their hosts reportedly sent them on the short-lived
kidnapping mission. Less than two weeks later, on July 11, more than a dozen armed men
kidnapped three Kenyan aid workers near the small town of Bacadwein in Puntland. 105 The
kidnappers hailed from the Sa’ad (Hawiye) and Omar Mohamud (Darod) sub-clan families that
quickly fell out with each other because their joint act triggered clashes with the clan hosting and
protecting the victims.
Besides similar internal clashes that they inevitably generate, the string of kidnappings speak to
an emerging pattern of land-based criminal networks and activities that, in the absence of
alternative legitimate livelihoods, are filling the void that piracy is leaving behind. While beyond
the scope of this report, some of these criminal activities predated piracy while others are new,
and they include human, arms and drug trafficking. The reach of these networks already include
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the Greater Horn of Africa region, mainly Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen.
Puntland officials consulted for this project said that they knew how to handle the post-piracy
challenges. It goes without saying, however, that they can benefit from constructive engagement
by and support from the international community and the regional countries. Failing to nip off
the bud local criminality will inevitably lead to fully-fledged and organized criminal networks
that may surpass piracy – possibly even reviving it in a different, more sophisticated form – with
consequential risk of spilling over. To begin with, the passive neglect and active obstruction of
the Puntland security sector needs to end. Moreover, all the Somali regions (Somaliland,
Puntland, and the rest of South and Central Somalia) need to develop joint security and
cooperative economic projects without necessarily compromising their respective positions on
and addressing questions of long-term political status – independence, autonomy, federal union
or unitary state.
Moreover, relevant Puntland ministries and directorates need to be brought together in an interministerial counter-piracy taskforce under the co-leadership of a senior minister or the vicepresident and the Director General for Counter-Piracy in order to coordinate their activities.
Throughout the Farole Administration, not only have the five relevant ministries operated
haphazardly, but the counter-piracy directorate remained under-staffed and seemed to operate
independently of the other offices. Besides the laudable ongoing local and international efforts to
harmonize the relations between the various Somali entities, the world community should assist
each of the Somali entities with multifaceted governance initiatives to not only strengthen state
security apparatus but also their capacity to deliver on non-security dividends.
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Conclusion

Piracy has shown dramatic decline in 2012 and 2013. It has remained at a record low since its
epic explosion in the mid-2000s. That is in large part due to the Somali-owned, land-based, and
peaceful as well as coercive counter-piracy initiatives that have gone unrecognized. Somali
accomplishments on land have been matched by relative success of foreign navies in reducing
successful hijackings. What is yet to be ascertained is the deterrent function that militarized
international responses played on the youth inland.
Nevertheless, all the combustible factors that were at the heart of the emergence and rise of
piracy are intact. Unemployment runs rampant. Poverty remains as high. Waste dumping 106 and
illegal, unregulated, unreported fishing continue unabated. 107 Even so, the United Nations
Security Council continues to treat counter-piracy as a security project (Chapter VII of the UN
Charter), relegating its developmental remedies to a myriad of incoherent and in many instances
self-replicating non-governmental organizations without an international mandate.108
Creating jobs and combating poverty among fishing coastal communities require the eradication
of IUU fishing and waste dumping, and the protection of the marine environment to enable it to
rehabilitate itself. But, not only is waste dumping still an unresolved international problem that
continues to deal devastating blows on weakly governed or ungoverned spaces, but the IUU
fishers continue to receive astronomical subsidies from their respective governments that enable
them to continue plundering already vulnerable coastal communities with impunity.109
Ransom piracy has wreaked incalculable damage to the Somalis themselves and for the most part
they took a stand against the pirates. While a relapse cannot be ruled out, the coastal
communities have made important gains in that regard with limited help from the state and none
from the outside world. It would make more sense – from a moral, political, economic and
security points of view – to join them in their own fight against the scourge they are confronting
from within and support them to overcome its consequences. Their gains must be capitalized on
to fortify local communities’ anti-piracy resolve by putting an end to repeated violation of their
waters (at least the inshore waters), helping them restore the fishing sector and identify and
expand other sustainable livelihood alternatives. Anything short of that would only bring about a
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semblance of normalcy as a thin veil over the ominous structural violence.
In light of piracy’s regional and global destabilizing potential the international community’s
security concerns, invocation of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, and deployment of
international navies are understandable.110 Moreover, United Nations Security Council justifiably
traced piracy back to the still ongoing instability in Somalia, as did many commentators and
analysts. Paragraph 2 of Resolutions 1950 (of 23 November 2010) and 1976 (of 11 April 2011)
recognized that “the ongoing instability in Somalia is one of the underlying causes of the
problem of piracy and contributes to the problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast
of Somalia, and stresses the need for a comprehensive response to tackle piracy and its
underlying causes by the international community.”111 The policy prescriptions that have so far
followed from the above perspectives and convictions are rather obvious: restoring the Somali
state as a principal guarantor of the needed stability on land.
Nevertheless, in treating piracy as a maritime security outgrowth of the overland turmoil and in
responding with military solutions, the international community by and large neglected piracy’s
developmental roots on land and its maritime harbingers, IUU fishing and waste dumping. A
relatively peaceful and sustainable solution to the scourge of piracy requires a rectification of this
gross neglect of piracy’s root causes. Ecological, moral, political and security imperatives
demand that these international crimes are urgently contained. While putting the Somali ‘humpty
dumpty’ back together again may not be impossible, its international security dividends on land
and at sea will not be forthcoming so long as illegal fishing and waste dumping remain rampant
– in reality or in the perception of the local communities. Containing these international crimes –
and combating the local perceptions – can also contribute toward alleviating poverty with
potential trickle down of security and political returns.
A first step in this direction is for the Somali Federal Government and the governments in
Somaliland and Puntland to harmonize their policies on practical issues that require sovereign
membership in the community of states. They then need to harmonize their respective and
common laws with the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) so
that Somalia can formalize its claims to the standard internationally recognized territorial waters
and Exclusive Economic Zone. Once the spatial extent of Somali ownership is clearly laid out,
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the international community would be better advised to assist the Somalis to exercise
commensurate authority over their waters. All three Somali government should then be
incentivized to suspend all fishing licenses, observe a moratorium on all bilateral or multilateral
fishing agreements, and evict all foreign fishing vessels at least from territorial sea of Somalia.
Equally important would be the enactment of an international mandate prohibiting and
preventing waste dumping in Somalia. In November 2011, the UN Security Council passed
Resolution 2020 urging states and competent international organizations “to positively consider
investigating allegations of illegal fishing and illegal dumping, including of toxic substances,
with a view to prosecuting such offences when committed by persons under their jurisdiction.”112
In following through this call, UN member states should expand the mandate of their navies in
the Gulf of Aden and Northwestern Indian Ocean region to include monitoring for waste
dumpers and IUU fishers.113 The international community should also assist coastal countries in
the region to construct and maintain functioning waste management facilities so that passerby
vessels can responsibly dispose of the inevitable vessel-generated refuse during the course of
their journey.
Finally, the creation of sustainable jobs that can progressively help people out of poverty remain
to be the final decisive step to end piracy in Puntland – or across Somalia for that matter.
Attention needs to be diverted to strategic projects like restoring infrastructure, building roads,
refurbishing the Bosaso port and developing some of the numerous natural harbors to ease the
pressure on Bosaso and spread the benefits too. Job-creation projects need to also aim at
expanding basic services, opening up and rehabilitating the economic sector mainly animal
husbandry, processing of animal products, and recovering of the fishing sector, among others.
Piracy in Somalia is down to the lowest level since the start of its steady rise in 2005 and
explosion in 2007. But its effects will remain for a long time to come. If they are not identified
and adequately addressed early on, it is only a matter of time until another wave of criminality
threaten the international sea-lanes, destabilize the economy and security of Puntland, and further
erode the Somali sociopolitical fabric.
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Endnotes
1

The International Maritime Bureau (IBM) recorded 15 attempts in 2013, which is a significant drop from 75 in
2012. Of the 15 attempts only 2 were successful hijackings. ICC IBM Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships –
2013 Annual Report, January 2014.
2

Clan-wise, the majority of Puntlanders belong to the Mejerten sub-group of the Darod, one of the five broad clan
divisions of the Somalis. The other sub-divisions of the Darod are the Dulbahante, Marehan, Ogadeni and
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